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Abstract   A hybrid simulation-based framework involving system dynamics and 
agent-based simulation is proposed to address duopoly game considering multiple 
strategic decision variables and rich payoff, which cannot be addressed by tradi-
tional approaches involving closed-form equations.  While system dynamics mod-
els are used to represent integrated production, logistics, and pricing determination 
activities of duopoly companies, agent-based simulation is used to mimic en-
hanced consumer purchasing behavior considering advertisement, promotion ef-
fect, and acquaintance recommendation in the consumer social network.  The pay-
off function of the duopoly companies is assumed to be the net profit based on the 
total revenue and various cost items such as raw material, production, transporta-
tion, inventory and backorder.  A unique procedure is proposed to solve and ana-
lyze the proposed simulation-based game, where the procedural components in-
clude strategy refinement, data sampling, gaming solving, and performance 
evaluation.  First, design of experiment and estimated conformational value of in-
formation techniques are employed for strategy refinement and data sampling, re-
spectively.  Game solving then focuses on pure strategy equilibriums, and perfor-
mance evaluation addresses game stability, equilibrium strictness, and robustness.  
A hypothetical case scenario involving soft-drink duopoly on Coke and Pepsi is 
considered to illustrate and demonstrate the proposed approach.  Final results in-
clude P-values of statistical tests, confidence intervals, and simulation steady state 
analysis for different pure equilibriums. 
Keywords   Simulation-based game, system dynamics, agent-based simulation, 
equilibrium, soft-drink duopoly  
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1. Introduction     
Duopoly games have been extensively studied in the modern history of economics, 
where the market is primarily dominated by two major companies and they make 
fully rational decisions to reach the goals (e.g. maximize payoff).  While the most 
widely used approaches to solve the duopoly game are based on Cournot model 
(Cournot, 1838) and Bertrand model (Bertrand, 1883), several major limitations of 
those models are that:  
• the payoff function of each company is highly aggregated by closed-form math-
ematical equations; 
• only single or limited decision variables (e.g. production quantity, product 
price) are considered for mathematical tractability; 
• no randomness involved in the payoff formulation.   
In real practice, however, competing companies have to make and update deci-
sions periodically on various areas such as production, logistics and price across 
the entire supply chain based on dynamically changing market conditions, and 
these decisions interact with one another to achieve a high profit.  Hence, a com-
prehensive modeling technique is desired to mimic the realistic processes in mul-
tiple areas mentioned above, so as to provide a highly accurate payoff as well as to 
enable analysis of the trade-offs among different strategies.   
In this chapter, a hybrid simulation-based framework is proposed to address 
duopoly game under the scenario of product adoption process considering multiple 
decision variables and detailed payoffs.  In the proposed hybrid simulation frame-
work,  
• system dynamics (SD) models are used for simulating the activities of duopoly 
companies on production, logistics, and price determination; 
• agent-based simulation (ABS) is used for modeling consumer purchasing be-
haviors at the market side.    
Figure 1 outlines the major components in an exemplary supply chain and con-
sumer market.  In the SD model, an integrated production-logistics model consid-
ering the material transformations and flows from suppliers to final customers is 
constructed for each duopoly company. The price determination process, which is 
also modeled in the SD simulation, represents how each company determines the 
product price and adjusts it over time due to the impacts of production and logis-
tics.  To this end, an enhanced consumer motivation function is developed based 
on various factors such as the effect of advertisement, the effect of promotion, the 
influences of customer acquaintance recommendation, and the price sensitivity in 
the consumer social network.  The consumer motivation function is then incorpo-
rated into the ABS for mimicking the consumer purchasing behaviors, which is 
tightly coupled with the SD model for the duopoly companies.   
 
Fig. 1 Exemplary supply chain and consumer market  
Considering the game strategy for duopoly games, emphasis has been put in the 
following strategic areas (Min and Zhou, 2002; Hong et al., 2008; Song and Jing, 
2010) including production strategy (e.g. labor, raw material availability), logistics 
strategy (e.g. lead time, inventory coverage control), and marketing strategy (e.g. 
price determination, advertising, promotion).  The strategic areas in the literature 
are coupled with the simulation model, so that any strategy changes can be reflect-
ed in simulation variables/parameters.  In the game theory literature, each of the 
above strategic areas involves different decisions that are referred to as strategies.  
The payoff function of each dominated company is defined in terms of net profit, 
which is the difference between the revenue and various cost items such as pro-
duction, logistics, transportation, and backorder.  In the proposed work of this 
chapter, the objective for each duopoly company is assumed to maximize the net 
profit via the coordination of all the considered strategies.   
In games involving a large number of strategies and data samples, conducting 
experiments including all the strategic decisions is computationally costly.  In or-
der to solve and analyze the simulation-based game in this work under limited 
computational resources, a novel procedure is proposed, where the procedural 
components include strategy refinement, data sampling, game solving, and per-
formance evaluation.  First, design of experiments technique used for strategy re-
finement and estimated conformational value of information (ECVI) technique 
used for data sampling are integrated for exploring the strategy space in the empir-
ical game setting.  Then, game solving for pure strategy equilibrium is applied to 
generate game equilibrium results, and performance evaluation approach is em-
ployed to assess various output criteria (e.g. equilibrium quality, stability, strict-
ness and robustness).  In the experiment section, a case with soft-drink duopoly 
game is considered to illustrate and demonstrate the framework.   
Figure 2 depicts major components of the framework in this chapter:  
• a hybrid simulation testbed of duopoly game with its profile set as inputs and 
payoff matrix as outputs (the upper part of Figure 2);  
• a GSA procedure including strategy refinement, data sampling, game solving 
and performance evaluation (the lower part of Figure 2).   
Fig. 2 Proposed hybrid simulation framework with the GSA procedure 
The major contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows: 
1. A novel simulation-based empirical game platform is proposed, which over-
comes the major drawbacks of closed-form mathematical equations in terms of 
modeling comprehensiveness; 
2. A novel simulation-based game solving and analysis (GSA) procedure is pro-
posed, which covers major topics in the field of game theory such as strategy 
refinement, data sampling, game solving, and performance evaluation.   
In fact, the proposed simulation platform allows for accurate representation of the 
real world scenario, and it targets to address such game problem involving large 
strategy space and detailed/rich payoff function.  Besides, the proposed platform is 
generic so that it can be re-used and further enhanced based on user requirements.  
The proposed GSA procedure is platform independent so that it can also be ap-
plied to resolve other similar simulation-based games.   
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  In Sect. 2, the literature works 
related to the proposed simulation-based game platform and the GSA procedure 
are summarized.  In Sect. 3, the details of different modeling aspects (e.g. produc-
tion, logistics, and marketing) that constitute the simulation-based game platform 
are provided, followed by the discussions of game strategies and payoff function.  
Sect. 4 discusses the motivation, objective of GSA, as well as its detailed proce-
dure including strategy refinement, data sampling, game solving, and performance 
assessment.  In Sect. 5, experiments are conducted and corresponding results are 
presented.  Finally, conclusions and future directions are discussed in Sect. 6.  
 
2. Background and Literature Survey 
The game theoretic approach has been applied in the literature to address strategic 
decision problems in supply chain and marketing activities, where the studies 
mainly focused on the relationships between stakeholders within the supply chain 
system.  For manufacturing strategy, Zhang and Huang (2010) investigated plat-
form commonality and modularity strategies in a supply chain consisting of a sin-
gle manufacturer and multiple cooperative suppliers.  They derived the optimal 
ordering and pricing decisions for the two-moves dynamic game according to 
Nash’s bargaining model, and developed an iterative algorithm to find the sub-
game perfect equilibrium.  They found that a supply chain with cooperative sup-
pliers is more effective by using the lot-for-lot policy and more competitive by ac-
commodating higher product variety.  For logistics/inventory control strategy, Yu 
et al. (2006) studied Stackelberg game in a Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) 
supply chain consisting one manufacturer as the leader and heterogonous retailers 
as followers.  The research proposed a 5-step algorithm to reach the Stackelberg 
equilibrium and demonstrated 1) the significant influence of market-related pa-
rameters on manufacturer’s and retailers’ profit, 2) higher inventory cost does not 
necessarily lead to lowing retailers’ profit and 3) game equilibrium benefits the 
manufacturer.  The pricing and marketing strategies have been studied in an inte-
grated manner in some literature works.  Parlar and Wang (1994) studied the dis-
counting strategy in a game involving one supplier with multiple homogeneous 
customers.  They demonstrated that both seller and buyers can improve their own 
profit by using a proper discounting strategy.  A similar game was also studied by 
Wang and Wu (2000).  The difference was that the customers in this study were 
heterogeneous, and a price policy was proposed, where seller offers price discount 
based on the percentage increase from a buyer’s quantity before discount.  The 
proposed policy was demonstrated to provide benefits for venders compared with 
the one based on buyer’s unit increase in order quantity.  Esmaeili et al. (2009) 
proposed seller-buyer supply chain models considering pricing and marketing 
strategic decision variables such as price charged by seller to buyer, lot size, buy-
er’s selling price, and marketing expenditure.  Both cooperative and non-
cooperative relationships between the seller and buyer were modeled assuming 
Seller-Stackelberg and Buyer-Stackelberg, respectively.  The experiment results 
showed both optimal selling price and marketing expenditure were smaller in the 
cooperative game.  While these works have provided guidance for addressing stra-
tegic decision making problems via a game theoretic approach, they faced limita-
tions in efficiently obtaining accurate payoffs for a large strategy space under real-
istic case scenarios (e.g. duopoly company competition). 
Most recently, simulation-based games have been employed to analyze com-
plex interactions of players in the areas of supply chain (Collins et al., 2004), 
combat (Poropudas and Virtanen, 2010), financial market (Mockus, 2010), sub-
contractor selection (Unsal and Taylor, 2011) and pedestrian behaviors (Asano et 
al., 2010).  An advantage of this approach is that simulation is capable of model-
ing the detailed players’ behaviors, their interactions as well as the external envi-
ronment impacts.  Hence, results from simulation are comprehensive and can be 
used for detailed analysis.  To the best of our knowledge, although simulation-
based game has been used for solving coordination problem within specific supply 
chain, a formal framework for solving integrated supply chain and its market 
competition game is not available in the literature.  Next several paragraphs main-
ly survey the past research works that have formed a basis in this chapter in two 
aspects:  
• SD and ABS modeling on supply chain and marketing activities, respectively; 
• Approaches for empirical game analysis.  
Concerning the simulation model for integrating the supply chain operations 
and marketing activities, different researchers have developed scenarios with dis-
tinct settings according to their own conveniences.  To unify them under a coher-
ent framework, the SD model in our work employs typical scenarios available in 
Sterman (2000) that involve labor utilization, raw material logistics, production 
process, and final production inventory control.  However, necessary modifica-
tions have been made due to the duopoly game setting, and ABS integration for 
consumer purchasing behavior (see Sect. 3 for details).  The consumer purchasing 
motivation and decision can be influenced by three factors (Kotler and Keller, 
2007): 
• personal (e.g. price sensitivity and quality sensitivity);  
• social (e.g. adoption from word of mouth, follower tendency); 
• psychological (e.g. perception and susceptibility to advertisement).   
ABS can not only explore how and why consumers made the decision of purchas-
ing certain products (North et al., 2010), but also evaluate the overall system per-
formance without sacrificing enough details on interdependency among company 
marketing behaviors.  Previous researchers (Jager et al., 1999; Adjali et al., 2005; 
Yoshida et al., 2007) have dealt with personal, social and psychological factors 
involving ABS technique.  In this chapter, based on Zhang and Zhang (2007), an 
enhanced motivation function is proposed to incorporate the effects of advertise-
ment, promotion from company, the influences of customer acquaintance recom-
mendation, and price sensitivity in the consumer market.  The consumer behavior 
modeled in ABS is coupled with the supply chain model to generate the market 
share and actual demand over time.       
Previous literature works related to the simulation-based game analysis of this 
chapter are summarized in the following two paragraphs.  A seminal research 
work in empirical game analysis is Wellman (2006), who decomposed the empiri-
cal game-theoretic analysis into three basic steps:  
1. parameterize strategy space, which means to generate a set of candidate strate-
gies from all available ones that are computationally intensive and costly inef-
fective to evaluate;  
2. estimate the empirical game, which is aimed to construct empirical payoff ma-
trix via simulation for the simplified game with the attention on the candidate 
strategies; 
3. analyze (solve) the empirical game, and assess the solution quality with respect 
to the original game with full strategy sets.   
For parameterizing strategy space, several baseline approaches are available in 
Wellman (2006) such as truthful revelation, myopic best response and game tree 
search.  These methods have been applied in auction game (Reeves, 2005) and 
multi-player chess game (Kiekintveld et al., 2006).  For estimating the empirical 
game, two approaches exist in the literature, including direct estimation and re-
gression.  The first approach treats the observations as direct evidence for the pay-
offs of each player’s strategy profile, while the idea of second method is to apply 
regression to fit an estimated payoff function over the entire profile space given 
the available data (Vorobeychik et al., 2007).  The goal of analyzing the empirical 
game is to find the pure and mixed strategy equilibrium firstly, and then to apply 
appropriate methods (e.g. statistical bounds) to gain insights into the original full 
game.  Degree of game-theoretic stability is usually used to provide an ε-Nash 
equilibrium under this case. 
Similar to our strategy refinement problem addressed in this chapter, Jordan et 
al. (2008) studied the profile selection problem with the objective of saving the 
computational costs for the promising equilibrium candidates.  The authors stud-
ied different algorithms applicable to two different models: TABU best-response 
search (Sureka and Wurman, 2005) and minimum regret-first search (MRFS) for 
revealed-payoff; expected value of information (EVI) (Walsh et al., 2003) and 
proposed information gain (IG) approach for noisy-payoff models.  Later on, Jor-
dan et al. (2010) solved a special case of the profile selection problem to deter-
mine an optimal simulation sequence of strategy sets.  The paper also clarified the 
differences between the profile selection problem (Jordan et al., 2008) and strate-
gy exploration problem.  Then, different exploration policies including random 
policy (RND), improving deviation only policy (DEV), best response policy (BR), 
softmax policy (ST) were discussed, followed by the experiments to compare their 
performances under different scenarios.  For the sampling approach, Walsh et al. 
(2003) referred to the large/infinite number of strategies in the populated strategy 
space as heuristic strategies, and proposed two information theoretic approaches 
(i.e. EVI and ECVI approaches) to compute the additional sampling number for 
each experimental step.  The paper demonstrated that ECVI approach converged 
faster than EVI given the same number of samples, and they both outperformed 
the uniform sampling approach.  As pointed out in these literature works, when 
dealing with a large game strategy space, strategy exploration/refinement and data 
sampling are always the dominant costs for solving and analyzing the game, 
which constitute the major motivation for the development of the proposed GSA 
procedure in Sect. 4. 
 
3. Hybrid Simulation-based Testbed for Duopoly 
Game Modeling  
In this section, two major functional components constitute the simulation test-
bed: supply chain and marketing.  The supply chain operations are modeled in SD, 
and marketing activities with its impact to the consumer behavior are modeled in 
ABS.  The supplying process at the upstream is responsible for providing raw ma-
terials to the manufacturer.  Production at the manufacturer begins when both raw 
material and labor are available.  Inventories are kept along the supply chain to 
satisfy the customer orders at the downstream, and backorder is considered when 
the demand can’t be fulfilled.  The product price is also determined in the SD 
model, and it is impacted by the competitive product in the market, and produc-
tion-logistics activities of its own company.  Consumer purchasing behaviors are 
represented in the ABS model, which are highly related to the companies’ market 
share and profit.  All these modeling details are presented in the rest of this sec-
tion. 
3.1 System Dynamics for Modeling Production-Logistics Activities  
Figures 3 and 4 are the snapshots for the production and logistics modules in the 
SD model, respectively, where equations from (1)-(21) represent underlying 
mathematical models and Table 1 provides nomenclatures for variables and pa-
rameters used in those equations.  The concepts behind the SD model developed in 
this chapter are based on Sterman (2000) and Venkateswaran and Son (2007), 
with the enhancements and customizations made for our study.  The major cus-
tomizations/enhancements include: 
• Duopoly game setting for our scenario; 
• Interaction with the marketing module in ABS model; 
• Incorporation of historical values via exponential moving average for adjusted 
production, inventory, labor, and vacancy; 
• Incorporation of variations in demand, production, inventory, labor availability. 
The entire production process has been aggregated into one stock in the SD 
model (see Eq. (1)).  One assumption made when constructing these equations is 
that we treat the time as discrete variable, while in the SD model the correspond-
ing variables change continuously.  The adjusted WIP and production amounts are 
calculated via exponential moving average (smoothing) as shown in Eq. (2) and 
Eq. (3).  As it is an order-driven inventory control and production system, the de-
sired amount of WIP is calculated by multiplying the total of adjusted production 
amount and customer order rate with the manufacturing cycle time plus the varia-
tions (see Eq. (4)); the desired amount of production begin rate is calculated by 
summing up the adjusted WIP amount, adjusted production amount, customer or-
der rate and the variations (see Eq. (5)).   
 
Fig. 3 Production module in the simulation-based game testbed (customized from Sterman 
(2000)) 
In the ideal case, the actual production begin rate is equal to the desired produc-
tion begin rate; however, it is always constrained by two other factors: workforce 
availability and raw material availability (see Eq. (6)).  The availability of raw 
material is determined by the upstream supplier, of which the modeling is analo-
gous to the logistics module of the finished goods (discussed later in this section).  
The labor changing process (e.g. vacancy creation and fulfillment) will be dis-
cussed in the next paragraph.  The actual production begin rate equals to the min-
imal one (bottleneck) of the workforce, raw material amount, and desired produc-
tion begin rate.  The production cost is tightly related to the product price, which 
will be discussed later in this section. 
One factor that influences the production plan is the labor availability.  The la-
bor is represented in one stock, and the labor vacancy rate is captured in another 
stock.  The equations for calculating these two stock values are shown in Eq. (7) 
and Eq. (8).  Hiring rate, retiring rate, and layoff rate are explicitly modeled in the 
SD model via Eq. (9), Eq. (10), and Eq. (11), respectively.  These three rates are 
the major variables for deciding the labor availability, and a variable called vacan-
cy begin rate will be increased if the SD model desires more labor.  The vacancy 
begin rate is computed by the adjusted amounts of labor and vacancy in total (see 
Eq. (12)).  And the adjusted amounts of labor and vacancy are calculated via ex-
ponential moving average (smoothing) in Eq. (13) and Eq. (14).  Finally, the de-
sired amounts of labor and vacancy are calculated in Eq. (15) and Eq. (16), which 
are similar to the calculations of desired production and inventory.  The decision 
variables considered in the production module are vacancy creation time 
(VacCT ), average time for layoff labors ( LayoffT ), labor fulfillment time 
( LaborFT ), and WIP fulfillment time (WIPFT ).    
 
Fig. 4 Logistics module in the simulation-based game testbed (customized from Sterman (2000)) 
The logistics part of the SD model is constituted with transportation and inven-
tory control components.  As the transportation lead time is simply used, it is 
translated into inventory fulfillment time for the ease of analysis and the following 
discussions in this paragraph focus only on the inventory part.  Similar to the pro-
duction process, one stock is used to aggregate the entire product inventory, and it 
is calculated in Eq. (17).  A retailer maintains an inventory of finished goods, and 
fills orders as they arrive from customers.  The desired shipment rate is set to be 
equal to the customer demand, while the actual shipment rate depends on the in-
ventory level of the supply chain system.  The customer order rate is calculated in 
Eq. (18), in which the market share and effects of advertisement and promotion 
are explicitly considered.  The un-fulfilled amount of goods will be accounted into 
backlog inventory, and is calculated for the backorder cost.  The order fulfillment 
ratio is then calculated based on the percentage of order being fulfilled, which is 
used to decide the actual shipment rate in Eq. (19).  Eq. (20) calculates the desired 
inventory level, which equals to the sum of minimal order processing time and 
safety level of stock, multiplied by the customer order rate.  The variations are al-
so included in Eq. (20).  The inventory coverage represents the time duration that 
the current inventory level under the current shipment rate can cover the customer 
order, and is a superior measure of both goods holding cost for the supply chain 
members and the capability of buyers to receive reliable and timely deliveries.  
This variable is calculated in Eq. (21), and also used to decide the inventory ef-
fects to the product price.  The decision variables considered in the logistics mod-
ule are inventory fulfillment time ( InvFT ), raw material transportation lead time 
( _M LT ), product safety stock coverage ( SSCov ), and raw material inventory 
coverage ( _M InvCov ).    
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Table 1 Nomenclature for system dynamics model 
Notation Explanation Notation Explanation 
ProdBR  Production begin rate  SSCov  Safety stock coverage 
Labor  Labor amount OrderR  Order rate 
ALT  Average labor working time 
per time period 
HireR  Labor hiring rate 
ALP  Average labor productivity  
per time period 
RetireR  Labor retire rate 
DProdBR
 
Desired production begin rate  LayoffR
 
Labor layoff rate 
AWIP  Adjustment amount for work-
in-process (WIP)  
VacBR  Vacancy begin rate 
DProd  Desired production  DHireR  Desired labor hiring rate 
DWIP  Desired amount of work-in-
process  
LaborFT  Labor fulfillment time 
WIP  Amount of work-in-process 
product 
DVac  Desired amount of vacancy 
WIPFT  Fulfillment time for work-in-
process product 
AVac  Adjustment amount for va-
cancy 
CycleT
 
Manufacturing cycle time  MSR  Raw material supplying rate 
ProdCR  Production complete rate  Vac  Labor vacancies 
AProd  Adjustment amount for  
production  
VacFT  Average time to fill vacan-
cies 
DInv  Desired inventory level EmployT  
Average time of employ-
ment 
Inv  Actual inventory level MaxLR  Maximum layoff rate 
InvFT  Fulfillment time for inventory VacCR  Vacancy Closure Rate 
OPT  Order processing time DLabor  Desired labor 
InvCov  Inventory coverage ALabor  Adjustment number of labor 
ShipR
 
Shipment rate LayoffT
 
Average time for layoff la-
bors 
MS  Market share TOR  Total order rate 
MaxInvCov  Capacity of inventory coverage  
( )Pc  
Unit production cost  
Price  Product price MP  Market expected price 
( )CPSens  
Price sensitivity to cost ( )IPSens  
Price sensitivity to inventory 
coverage 
( )CF  
Effect of inventory coverage  
on price 
( )IF  
Effect of cost on price 
PriceCR  Price changing rate MPFT  Fulfillment time of market 
expected price 
( )W  
Variations for desired WIP ( )W  
Exponential smoothing fac-
tor for adjusted WIP 
( )P  
Variations for desired produc-
tion begin rate 
( )P  
Exponential smoothing fac-
tor for adjusted production  
( )O  
Variations for order rate ( )L  
Exponential smoothing fac-
tor for adjusted labor 
( )I  
Variations for desired invento-
ry level 
( )V  
Exponential smoothing fac-
tor for adjusted vacancy 
* Subscripts i and t are omitted. i is player index (i=A,B), t represents simulation replication 
time. 
The product price is determined by Eq. (22) according to Sterman (2000), in 
which three major parts take effects:  
• effect of production costs on price; 
• effect of inventory coverage on price;  
• impact of retailer/market expected price.   
Figure 5(a) depicts the price determination module in the SD model.  Inside the 
price determination mechanism, the effects of duopoly company competition (an 
enhancement to the original model) is incorporated into the calculation of the re-
tailer expected price.  The effect of production costs on price captures the retail-
er’s beliefs on the production costs relative to the expected product price (see Eq. 
(23)).  Either the production cost information ( ( ) 0CPSens = ) or the retailer’s be-
lief ( ( ) 1CPSens = ) can be ignored depending on the values of sensitivity of price 
to costs.  The effect of inventory coverage on price measures how the relative in-
ventory coverage of supply chain members affects the product price.  The sensitiv-
ity of price to inventory coverage serves as the exponent of the relative inventory 
coverage (see Eq. (24)), and its value is negative to reflect the relationship be-
tween inventory coverage and price (lower inventory coverage results in higher 
price). These two equations (Eq. (23) and Eq. (24)) confirm to the original model 
in Sterman (2000).  The third part of the price determination is related with the re-
tailer/market expected price.  For a particular type of product, retailers and the 
consumer market always maintain the belief about the expected price, mainly rely-
ing on the past price of similar product.  For the simplicity concern, the price bid-
dings among retailer, wholesaler and manufacturer are not explicitly modeled; 
however, to reflect the price adjustment process over time, the changing rate of 
market expected price is calculated by the difference of product average price and 
market/retailer expected price divided by a pre-defined fixed time length (see Eq. 
(25)).  In the price determination process, the experimental control variables con-
sidered are price sensitivity to production cost ( ( ) [0,1]CPSens  ), price sensitivity 
to inventory coverage ( ( ) [ 1,0]IPSens  − ), and manufacturer expected price 
( _Mfg Price ).   
Fig. 5 (a) price determination module in SD model (left); (b) consumer purchasing behavior in 
ABS model (right) 
3.2 Agent-Based Simulation for Modeling Consumer Purchasing Be-
havior  
Figure 5(b) is the module snapshot of the consumer purchasing behavior in ABS 
model.  Equations from (26)-(36) represent underlying mathematical relationships 
of the module, and Table 2 provides nomenclatures for variables and parameters 
used in those equations.  For the marketing expense, it is assumed to have two as-
pects: advertisement and promotion.  Eq. (26) and Eq. (27) are used to calculate 
the spending for advertisement and promotion over a considered time period (i.e. a 
period for a certain marketing strategy).  The amount of marketing budget is de-
cided according to the company’s revenue.  The Chief Marketing Officer (CMO) 
Council report (2010) demonstrates a direct relation between marketing budget 
and revenue for various companies.  Based on our case study (i.e. soft drink duo-
poly), the corresponding percentage of marketing investment is selected.  An ad-
justment factor is introduced in these two equations to ensure that a realistic sce-
nario (e.g. order of magnitude) can be achieved.  The market spending rate is then 
derived (see Eq. (28)) by incorporating the adjustment time for spending market 
budget into the calculation.  The decision variables considered in the marketing 
strategy are marketing budget ( MB ), advertisement intensity ( Ad ), and promo-
tion depth ( Pm ). 
Marketing force concept in this work has been adopted from extended Lanches-
ter model (Naik et al., 2005) and is depicted in Eq. (29).  The marketing force de-
pends not only on the weight of advertisement intensity, promotion efforts (e.g. 
frequency and depth), but also on their marketing strategy interactions that are 
discussed in details in the next paragraph.  The marketing force is the leading 
power, which influences the consumer’s perception (e.g. sensitivity of promotion, 
susceptibility of advertisement) of a particular product.  In this chapter, these rela-
tionships are captured in Eq. (30), Eq. (31), and Eq. (32).  As the market force is 
dynamically updated through the simulation run, the consumer’s perception is also 
updated according to the change of market force.  This assumption implies that if 
a company loses most of the market, it would have to sacrifice even more to win 
back the market share.  
Another important feature in the ABS model is that we explicitly incorporate 
the marketing interaction effects between companies.  These marketing interac-
tions include the binding constraints on the sum of expenditures on the advertise-
ments and promotions, as well as the segregation of locations and communication 
channels expressed in terms of expenses (Naik et al., 2005).  In this work, the 
mathematical formulation is based on these concepts, where the interactions for 
each pair of activities are explicitly modeled.  To take the strategic foresight of 
manager into account, co-state dynamics in Eq. (33) is adopted, and the interaction 
effects between companies are formulated as the co-state variables.  The values of 
co-state variables in the next time point are captured by the differential equation 
given the current interaction effects.  Then, the sunk cost is calculated (see Eq. 
(34)), which incurs due to the strategic interactions between duopoly companies.  
The case study presented in Sect. 5.1 provides more details on these interactions in 
the context of a soft drink duopoly competition. 
In a consumer market, consumers make the adoption decision based on various 
factors from both the companies and environment, such as unit price, advertise-
ment, promotion, quality, and word-of-mouth recommendations.  In our simula-
tion model, it is assumed that an agent (i.e. consumer) becomes an adopter of a 
particular product based on the motivation function incorporating effects of four 
factors—price sensitivity, advertisement influence, promotion sensitivity, and ac-
quaintance influence.  Based on the model in Zhang and Zhang (2007), we pro-
posed an improved formula to calculate the consumer motivation to purchase 
brand i at time point t, in which the motivation value is decided by the following 
three attributes of price, advertisement intensity, and agent influence exerted by 
other agents (consumers).  The enhancements made in this work are as follows: 
• incorporation of a social network structure to represent interactions among 
agents; 
• incorporation of advertisement and promotion factors to mimic more realistic 
decision making process. 
In our study, a scale-free social network model called Barabasi-Albert Model 
(BA model, also known as Preferential Attachment Model) (Albert and Barabasi 
2002) is built to represent the social relationships of customers for the artificial 
market.  The BA model reflects the “rich-get-richer” phenomenon in societies and 
the degree of nodes follows a power-law distribution, in which the probability of a 
new node connecting to an existing node is proportional to the degree of it.  To in-
corporate the advertisement and promotion effects from marketing activities into 
the consumer purchasing decision, the price sensitivity, susceptibility to adver-
tisement, promotion-sensitivity and follower tendency, have been set to associate 
with price, advertisement, promotion, and recommendation influence, respective-
ly.  The initial value of susceptibility to advertisement, promotion-sensitivity and 
follower tendency are pre-set at the beginning of simulation run.  The price sensi-
tivity is an exponential function of the difference between the real price of a prod-
uct and the expected average price of the product (see Eq. (35)).  In this equation, 
s is a price parameter (s>1), and takes the same values for the similar competitive 
types of product, m is a constant and its value is based on an agent's socio-
economic attributes (e.g. millionaires are less price sensitive than unemployed 
persons).  The consumer purchasing motivation function is calculated in Eq. (36), 
which decides the product selection of consumers.  It is assumed that agents will 
always select a product having a higher motivation value, and randomly choose 
one if the motivation values are equal.   
i i iAdS K MB Ad=     
(26) 
i i iPmS K MB Pm=     
(27) 
( )i i iMSR AdS PmS AdjTimeMS= +   
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1 2 3i i i i i iMF Ad Pm Ad Pm Inter  = + + +  
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Table 2 Nomenclature for agent-based model 
Notation Explanation Notation Explanation 
MB  Marketing budget   Co-state parameter 
Ad  Advertisement intensity   Co-state factor  
Pm  Promotion depth 
( )sC  
Marketing sunk cost of the 
duopoly companies 
K  Adjustment factor Inf  
Follower tendency influ-
ence 
AdS  Spending rate on adver-
tisement 
M  Customer purchasing moti-
vation function  
PmS  Promotion spending rate  SensP  Price sensitivity  
AdjTimeMS
 
Adjustment time for 
marking budget spending 
SensPm  Sensitivity of consumer to 
promotion  
MSR  Marketing spending rate  SusAd  Susceptibility of consumer 
to the advertisement  
, 1,2,3i i =  
Weights of market force 
effects 
Ft  Follower tendency  
Inter  Interaction effect between 
two duopoly companies 
,s m  Price sensitivity parameters 
MF  Marketing force  , ,a p fI I I  
Initial value of SusAd , 
SensPm , and Ft . 
F  Total marketing force  _Mfg Price  
Manufacturer expected 
price 
* Subscripts i and t are omitted. i is player index (i=1,2), t represents simulation time. 
3.3 Payoff in Simulation-based Duopoly Game  
The total net profit serves as the payoff of simulation-based game, which is calcu-
lated in Eq. (37).  The cost items constituting the payoff function based on the 
simulation outputs are depicted in Table 3.  All different cost items across the pro-
duction, logistics and marketing activities are considered in the payoff function, 
and the time length to calculate all the cost items is the total simulation replication 
length.  After the simulation run, the outputs are collected to calculate the net prof-
it earned for each company.  A payoff matrix is then constructed based on the out-
puts and is used to approximate the best response (i.e. equilibrium) of the duopoly 
game, which will be discussed in Sect. 4. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
P R I B T M S
i i i i i i i iPayoff TRev C C C C C C C= − + + + + + +  
(37) 
Table 3 Nomenclature for game payoff components 
Payoff components Descriptions 
iTRev  
Total revenue for product i 
( )P
iC  
Total production cost for product i 
( )R
iC  
Total raw material purchasing cost for product i 
( )I
iC  
Total inventory cost for product i 
( )B
iC  
Total backlog cost for product i 
( )T
iC  
Total transportation cost for product i 
( )M
iC  
Total marketing spending for product i 
 4. Simulation-based Game Solving and Analysis  
In this section, a detailed simulation-based game solving and analysis (GSA) pro-
cedure proposed in this chapter will be discussed.  The intent of the proposed pro-
cedure is to make the problem tractable by restricting the profile strategies that 
each company is allowed to play without losing the generalization from the origi-
nal game.  Large strategy spaces consist of continuous and multi-dimensional ac-
tion sets, while the perfect information assumption is hold to reduce the problem 
complexity for analysis.  Due to the symmetric property of the game, two agents 
are assumed to have identical behavior possibilities, and be exposed to the same 
customer market.  Before discussing the details of the GSA components and pro-
cedure, notations regarding a normal form game, simulation-based game and the 
equilibrium concepts are introduced first. 
4.1 Setup and Motivation  
A normal form game can be formally expressed as [ ,{ , ( )},{ ( )}]i i iI s s u s =  , 
where I refers to the set of players and I = {1, 2} in our study; is  and ( )is  de-
notes the pure and mixed strategy for player i ( i I ) respectively; ( )iu s is the 
payoff function of player i when strategy profile s has been selected.  An im-
portant variable frequently used in analyzing normal form game is regret of a pro-
file s S , denoted by ( )r s , which is calculated in Eq. (38).   
( ) max max ( , ) ( )
ii s i i i i
r s u s s u s −= −   (38) 
In Eq. (38), { { }}i i is S s  − and s-i represents for a strategy profile other than that 
of player i.  Next, definition regarding game solution is given as follows: a Nash 
Equilibrium of the normal-form game is a strategy profile s S  such that for eve-
ry player i I , Eq. (39) holds.   
( ) ( , ),i i i i i iu s u s s s S−      (39) 
In this chapter, Nash equilibrium, equilibrium, and game solution terms are used 
interchangeably.  Furthermore, the symmetric game setting is also considered, in 
which the following two conditions need to be satisfied:  
• i jS S= for all players ,i j I ;  
• ( , ) ( , )i i i j j ju s s u s s− −= for every i js s= and i js s− −= .   
In addition, the terms of simulation-based game and empirical game are used 
interchangeably because they essentially convey identical meanings.  A simula-
tion-based game is defined that the player’s payoff is specified via simulation 
models, and the definition of empirical game is focused on estimating the payoff 
matrix using simulation outputs (Vorobeychik, 2008).  In the empirical game set-
ting with a large number of strategy profile and noisy samples involved, calculat-
ing the exact Nash Equilibrium is sometimes intractable.  Another way of approx-
imating it is applying  -Nash Equilibrium (  : tolerance), which is a profile 
s S satisfying Eq. (40) for every player i I .   
( ) ( , ),i i i i i iu s u s s s S − +      (40) 
As the game is constructed in simulation, we differentiate two types of payoff: the 
true payoff existing in a real practice duopoly and the estimated payoff obtained 
from simulation outputs.  When constructing an empirical payoff matrix, a simula-
tion model will be run to obtain noisy samples for each pure or mixed strategy 
profile.  The noisiness in the sample includes the randomness from the simulation 
experiments as well as the players’ mixed strategies (Vorobeychik, 2010).  Empir-
ical game is the one, which maintains the same strategy profiles for all players 
while the payoffs of them involve noise.  For each specific profile of any player in 
an empirical game, the payoff is an estimate value by taking arithmetic mean of 
multiple data points from the noisy sample as shown in Eq. (41).   
,
1
ˆ ( ) ( )
n
i n ij
j
u s U s n
=
=
   (41) 
The equation shows an estimate of payoff to player i for profile strategy s based 
on n samples.  From now on for the terminologies used in our discussions, readers 
are suggested to refer to Table 4.   
Table 4 Clarification of terminologies used 
Name Definition Explanation 
Aggregated strategic factor 
The factor including aggregated  
information of other factors 
Production factor, Logistics fac-
tor,  
Detailed strategic factor 
The factor decomposed from ag-
gregated strategic factor 
Order lead time, safety stock 
coverage decomposed from lo-
gistics factor 
Strategic factor levels 
The different levels (i.e. values) 
that a factor can achieve/attain 
(H) for high level of production 
factor  
Strategy 
Combination of different levels  
for a group of strategic factors* 
(H, L, L, H)*  
Profile 
Combination of strategies chosen  
by game players  
{(L, L, H, H)1, (H, L, H, L)2} is 
one profile for a two-player 
game 
Solution profile 
Players’ profile obtained when 
game reaches the equilibrium 
Element(s) in the profile set 
Solution payoff 
Players’ payoff obtained when 
game reaches the equilibrium 
Element(s) in the payoff matrix 
True payoff 
The ideal payoff for the game 
player 
( )u s with respect to profile s  
Estimated payoff 
The estimated payoff value ob-
tained from simulation 
,ˆ ( )i nu s with respect to profile s 
by running n simulation samples 
*H: high, L: low; strategic factor: decision variable. 
 
The academic challenge of solving such a game is that the constrained simula-
tion and experimental resource cannot afford the enormous number of strategies 
and samples.  According to the discussion in Sect. 3, the duopoly game includes 
totally 12 strategic factors for each player: if every single strategic factor takes on-
ly two levels, the total number of profiles in the entire profile set under symmetric 
game setting is (212)2/2=8,388,608.  Assuming each simulation replication takes 1 
second and only 10 replications are taken for each individual profile, the total time 
needed to complete the simulation of the entire profile set would be 2.66 years, 
which is unrealistic to perform in practice.   
The above computational challenge motivates development of the GSA proce-
dure in this chapter.  As it is impractical to construct a comprehensive payoff ma-
trix and achieve the exact game equilibrium(s) by involving all strategic factors 
(and their levels), targeting on the critical factors that can approximate the true 
equilibrium becomes the major undertaking.  As the number of profiles is reduced, 
the sample size for each profile can be increased accordingly.  The trade-offs be-
tween strategy refinement and data sampling is: given a fixed amount of simula-
tion/experimental resources, exploring more profiles decreases the number of 
samples that can be chosen, which may influence the accuracy of estimated game 
payoff by the end; while more samples will restrict the span of profiles to be se-
lected, which may rule out the key strategies that will impact the game solution 
eventually.  Other than the strategy refinement and data sampling, a game solving 
engine/algorithm and performance evaluation criteria are also needed to complete 
the GSA. 
4.2 Simulation-based Game Solving and Analysis 
To resolve the formulated simulation-based game, four components are required: 
• First of all, an approach to explore and refine the strategy space is needed.  As 
discussed before, some strategies are more significant to determine the game 
equilibrium than others.  Our objective here is to explore those critical strate-
gies in a more detailed manner so that insights can be gained on how the key 
strategic factors can impact on the game equilibrium.   
• Second, a method to decide the sampling procedure is needed.  As known, 
sampling cost and information gain are always the trade-offs during the sam-
pling procedure.  Given the sampling resource availability and capability, the 
sampling procedure should be able to achieve the maximum information gain 
so as to better approximate the true game payoff.   
• Third, a game solving engine is needed, which will allow us to find equilibri-
um(s) for the simulation-based game under different initial game settings (e.g. 
initial strategy profile, problem scenario).  The game solution should include 
pure, mixed or both types of equilibriums.   
• Forth, evaluation criteria for assessing the performance of GSA procedure is 
needed, which will capture the main features of the GSA procedure by dealing 
with the game equilibrium results.  The evaluation criteria should also contain 
the assessments of major equilibrium properties (e.g. weakness, strictness, sta-
bility, and robustness). 
We first formulate an algorithm, which depicts how these four components men-
tioned above work together to solve and analyze the simulation-based game.  Then 
detailed contents on each component are discussed.  Note that each round of the 
GSA procedure run is called an iteration.  The GSA procedure includes the fol-
lowing major steps: 
 
Step 1 Develop an initial game profile set by selecting strategic factor levels, then 
choose an initial sample size for each profile and set g equals to 1. 
Step 2 Run the simulation model based on the selected profile set and sample size, 
construct the empirical payoff matrix according to the simulation outputs. 
Step 3 (Game Solving) Solve the game for pure strategy equilibrium by improv-
ing the unilateral deviation set for each player one after the other until no 
more improvements can be obtained.  
Step 4 (Strategy Refinement) Employ design of experiments technique to decide 
the statistical significance of each aggregated strategic factor with respect 
to the game payoff.  Then, if g equals to 1, go to Step 4.1; if g equals to 2, 
go to Step 4.2. 
Step 4.1 Include all the detailed strategic factors, which are decomposed 
from the current significant aggregated strategic factor, into the 
refined profile set; eliminate the insignificant aggregated strate-
gic factor(s) from the refined profile set.  If no more detailed 
strategic factors can be included, go to Step 5 and set g equals to 
2.   
Step 4.2 Include more strategic factor levels into the refined profile set for 
the next iteration, go to Step 5.  If no more levels for each stra-
tegic factor need to be added, terminate the GSA process and go 
to Step 6. 
Step 5 (Data Sampling) Given the significant strategic factors and their levels in 
the refined profile set, decide the sample size for each profile using the 
enhanced ECVI sampling approach.  Go to Step 2. 
Step 6 (Performance Evaluation) Based on the game equilibrium results, calcu-
late values for all the evaluation criteria inside and between GSA itera-
tions, and summarize the results. 
 
Steps 1 and 2 are mainly for algorithm initialization and payoff generation, respec-
tively.  An indicator variable g is used in Step 4, which represents the refinements 
of either strategic factors (g=1) or factor levels (g=2).  Provided that a reasonable 
experimental time and cost can be spent on the simulation experiments, the trade-
offs between the strategy refinement extent and data sampling size always exist.  
Table 5 provides comparison results with varying numbers of strategy refinement 
and sampling size given a fixed affordable experimental time (i.e. 5 days) for the 
simulation run.  The lower limit of the experimental cost is bounded by ensuring a 
minimum degree of strategy refinement and sampling size, while the upper limit is 
related with the total affordable experimental cost.  As shown in Table 5, if each 
experimental iteration is selected to be 5 days, a total of four strategic factors can 
be selected to ensure a reasonable number of samples (i.e. 150) in the experiments. 
Table 5 Trade-offs between strategy refinement and data sampling 
Total  
strategic  
factors 
No. of  strategies 
for each player 
(level = 2) 
No. of profiles 
to be evaluated 
Affordable ex-
perimental time 
limit (days) 
Time per 
simulation  
replication 
(seconds) 
No. of samples 
affordable for 
each profile 
1 2 3 5 20 7200 
2 4 10 5 20 2160 
3 8 36 5 20 600 
4 16 136 5 20 158.82 
5 32 528 5 20 40.90 
6 64 2080 5 20 10.38 
7 128 8256 5 20 2.62 
8 256 32896 5 20 0.66 
9 512 131328 5 20 0.16 
10 1024 524800 5 20 0.04 
 
The strategy refinement method essentially seeks to find out in which order and 
with what specific strategic factor levels to include the strategies to the simulation-
based game analysis.  It is slightly different to the strategy exploration problem in 
Jordan et al. (2008), with the modification of the word “refinement” that is tightly 
related with both the game strategy and simulation modeling details.  As noted be-
fore, each strategic factor (e.g. production) involves different detailed aspects (e.g. 
labor control, raw material procurement).  The strategic factors that are more sig-
nificant than others should be considered with priority in the simulation testbed 
and also decomposed into more detailed levels for analysis.  The purpose of doing 
so is to approximate the game equilibrium without evaluating all the strategy pro-
files, which is time-consuming, cost-inefficient, and even intractable.  The strategy 
refinement process, which starts from an aggregated level and then moves to a 
more detailed level, is set as follows:  
• For the initial experiment, the focus of the profile set (simulation inputs) is only 
at the aggregated strategic factors (e.g. production, logistics), and multiple (e.g. 
2) levels of these factors are selected for experimental study.   
• Design of experiments technique is then used to identify the critical strategy 
profiles by analyzing the simulation outputs.  Figure 6 depicts the process, in 
which the inputs to the experimental design is the different levels of strategic 
factors and the empirical payoff matrix generated from simulation outputs, 
while the outputs of the experimental design are the factors that have signifi-
cant impacts on the game payoff.   
• Then, for those critical strategies, more insights on how different values of stra-
tegic factors impact the game payoff are investigated via partitioning the fac-
tors into detailed factors or levels depending on the requirements.  Then, we 
treat each strategic factor or level as the input to the simulation for the next ex-
periment iteration.   
 
Fig. 6 Experimental design for strategic factor refinement via simulation  
The above mentioned process (i.e. empirical payoff generation via game simula-
tor, identification of significant factors via experimental design) is applied itera-
tively in GSA procedure.  During the iterative process, game is solved and the 
immediate results are used to find the corresponding profiles for sampling.  It is 
noted that under different simulation scenarios, the outputs of experimental design 
may be different.  In addition, various experimental design techniques may be ap-
plied as long as they provide better insights into the analysis.  This work employs 
a standard two-level full factorial experimental design technique as a pilot study 
for strategy refinement. 
For sampling significant profiles, an approach named estimated conformational 
value of information (ECVI) in Walsh et al. (2003) has been enhanced in this 
chapter.  The ECVI measures the degree to which further samples would reduce 
the estimated error (denoted by ˆ( )e x ) of the current equilibrium solution (see Eq. 
(42) and Eq. (43)).   
, ,ˆ ˆ( ( )) ( ) ( )i p i p ie x s u s u s= −   
(42) 
| , , .ˆ ˆ( | , , ) [ ( ( )) ( ( ))]q p i p i p qECVI q i s p E e x s e x s= −  
(43) 
 
In Eq. (42) and Eq. (43), s represents a strategy chosen to conduct sampling, p and 
q refer to the number of data points being sampled and to be sampled, respective-
ly.  The maximum information gain is achieved by selecting the maximum value 
of ECVI, which also indicates the best choice of samples.  This method has been 
chosen in our study as it has been approved to show significant improvement over 
the uniform sampling method.  While the criteria for stopping sampling and the 
tradeoff between the sampling cost and information value gain are not discussed in 
details in Walsh et al. (2003), our work addresses them explicitly.  The sampling 
cost mainly depends on the simulation replication length, and the information val-
ue gain refers to how important more samples can help to make an accurate deci-
sion.  In this chapter, two separate items in ECVA are classified in the GSA pro-
cedure:  
• A pre-selected threshold value of affordable sampling size, which is the maxi-
mum number of samples that can afford to run for each profile based on the ex-
perimental resource availability.  
• A lower limit of ECVI gain, which is designed by user and aimed to ensure the 
game solution quality.   
Under the two criteria discussed above, we want to find the corresponding sample 
size either satisfying the lower limit of ECVI gain (denoted by ( )LsECVI ), or 
reaching the limit of sampling capability (denoted by sN ), as shown in Eq. (44).   
( )min( , )Ls sp q N ECVI+ =   
(44) 
This enhancement provides flexibility to users, where they can select their own 
threshold values depending on the experiment requirements.  In our experimental 
study, we have applied this approach to eliminate the twisted sample values (the 
extreme low and high values), which constitute about 10% of all data samples. 
Integration of strategy refinement and data sampling discussed so far in this 
section contributes to the uniqueness of the proposed GSA approach.  This inte-
gration allows us to combine the advantages of both, as well as to avoid the poten-
tial drawbacks of spending additional simulation resources for sampling all pro-
files.  The next step in our procedure is to input the selected game strategy profile 
and sample size into the simulation-based game testbed.  The simulation outputs 
are then collected to construct the empirical payoff matrix.  Then, we apply a 
game solving engine to calculate the pure Nash Equilibrium for the duopoly play-
ers.  The game solving engine computes the equilibrium by improving the unilat-
eral deviation set in Eq. (45) for each player one after another, until no more pay-
off gain can be obtained.   
( ) {( , ) : }, 1,2i i i i iD s s s s S i−=  =   
(45) 
This is a traditional approach, but still the most effective and efficient way to ob-
tain the pure Nash Equilibrium.  As the empirical payoff matrix always involves 
variations, an  -Nash Equilibrium concept (see Eq. (40)) is used to ensure that the 
potential optimum solutions are included during each experiment iteration.   
As the game solution involves variations due to different reasons such as lim-
ited simulation/experimental resources and sampling errors inherent to simulation, 
proper criteria on assessing the GSA procedure has been developed in this chapter.  
As mentioned earlier, the GSA procedure stops when no more iteration (e.g. strat-
egy refinements) can be established.  As each experiment iteration proceeds and 
the simulation gains more fidelity (details), we intend to find 1) whether the equi-
librium stays unchanged or evolves to be better (e.g. strictness vs. weakness), 2) 
how the modeling details can impact the game payoff, and 3) how sensitive the 
equilibrium(s) are to the disturbances.  The evaluation criteria developed in this 
work focus on the following aspects:  
• confidence intervals of the game equilibrium(s) for examining the closeness of 
estimated and true payoffs (See Eq. (46));  
, ,ˆ ˆPr( ( ) ( ) ( ) ) 1i n i i nu s u s u s  −   + = −  
(46) 
• statistical test (i.e. two-sample t-test) for evaluating the differences between so-
lution profile and its neighboring profiles;  
• statistical test (i.e. two-sample t-test) for evaluating the differences between so-
lution payoffs over iterations; 
• experimental studies on the stability of the game equilibrium(s): the equilibri-
um stability concepts applied here are originated from Szidarovszky and Bahill 
(1998), and we define three types of stability as follows:  
– Asymptotic stability with respect to game equilibrium refers to that for a 
given initial game state (i.e. players’ initial profile), the player payoff for 
the solution profile eventually converges to the solution payoff. 
– Marginal stability with respect to game equilibrium is the one that for a 
given initial game state, the player payoff for the solution profile converg-
es to a region containing the considered solution payoff and its tolerance. 
– Instability with respect to game equilibrium refers to the players’ profile 
that does not belong to the above two categories. 
 
5. Experiments and Results 
5.1 Soft-drink Duopoly Experiment Setup 
Under the current market scanner, the soft drink industry exhibits a classic exam-
ple of duopolies involving integrated supply chain and marketing activities.  Cola 
wars between The Coca-Cola Company® and PepsiCo Inc® and related literature 
works (Morris, 1987) have served as a basis for our case study.  The two compa-
nies together account for about three-quarters of the total soft drink market share.  
In fact, the industry has high operational overlap since different suppliers and 
manufacturers (e.g. producers and bottlers) possess similar impetus of sales and 
profits along the supply chain, and in the market side a similar customer base is 
shared for the duopoly companies.  While the soft drink industry as a whole en-
joys positive economic profits among all of its members, the ultimate goal for the 
industry should be to create a win-win situation for both the manufacturers as well 
as the customers. 
As mentioned earlier, both Coca-Cola Company® and PepsiCo Inc® mainly 
trade on supply chain and marketing values, and invest substantial portion of their 
revenues in those areas.  Modeling of the major activities in those areas has been 
discussed in Sect. 3.  Different values of the decision parameters for the proposed 
simulation model depict the various scenarios encountered in the soft drinks duo-
poly.  Table 6 shows the strategic factor values used in the experiments of this 
chapter, and the length of simulation replication run is about 3 months (100 days).  
We then estimate a payoff matrix through the constructed normal-form simula-
tion-based game, with the emphasis on the strategies mentioned in Table 6.    
Table 6 Strategic factors and levels used in experiments 
Aggregated 
strategic  
Detailed strategic  
factor 
Strategic factor levels 
Low* High* 
factor       L                ML           MH               H  
Manufacturing  
Vacancy creation time 
(days) 
1 5 
Average time for layoff 
labors (days) 
3 7 
Labor fulfillment time 
(days) 
4 12 
WIP fulfillment time 
(days) 
1 3 
Logistics  
Inventory fulfillment 
time (lead time)(days) 
2   6   10 14  
Raw material transpor-
tation lead time (days) 
1 3  5 7 
Product safety stock 
coverage (days) 
2 6 10 14 
Raw material inventory 
coverage (days) 
1 3 5  7 
Pricing  
Price sensitivity to pro-
duction cost ( [0,1] )  
0.1 0.9 
Price sensitivity to in-
ventory coverage 
( [ 1,0] − ) 
-0.1 -0.9 
Manufacturer expected 
price ($) 1 
5% of revenue 
2 
15% of revenue 
Marketing  
Marketing budget (MB) 
($) 
Promotion depth (% of 
MB, uniform distribut-
ed) 
(0.1,0.2) (0.2,0.3)  (0.3,0.4)  
 
(0.4,0.5)  
Advertising intensity 
(% of MB, uniform dis-
tributed) 
(0.1,0.2) (0.2,0.3) (0.3,0.4) (0.4,0.5) 
*L: low, ML: medium low, MH: medium high, H: high. 
 
Table 7 shows the strategic factors and levels involved in each experiment iter-
ation.  To balance the trade-offs between strategy refinement and data sampling, 
16 strategies for each player (4 strategic factors) and 70 initial data samples for 
each profile are selected during each experiment iteration (the total number of pro-
file is 16*16=256).  As the considered game is symmetric, only the upper triangu-
lar of the strategy matrix is used for sampling, which is equivalent to 136 
([(16*16)-16]/2+16=136) profile sets.  After applying the modified ECVI data 
sampling approach, samples with roughly 10 upper and 10 lower extreme values 
have been eliminated for each profile.  So the effective sample size in our experi-
ment is 50.  As each iteration may involve different strategic factors (aggregated 
or detailed), notation ( ) ( )( , )k km nS S is used to represent the profile information for 
player A selecting strategy m ( 1, 2,...,16m = ) and player B selecting strategy n 
( 1, 2,...,16n = ) during kth iteration.   
Table 7 Strategic factors used over GSA iteration in experiments 
Iteration Strategic factors 
Strategic factor 
levels* 
Iteration Strategic factors 
Strategic factor 
levels* 
1st  Manufacturing L/H 2nd  
Advertising  
intensity 
L/H 
1st  Logistics L/H 3rd  
Raw material inven-
tory coverage 
L/ML/MH/H 
Product safety stock 
coverage 
1st  Pricing L/H 3rd  
Raw material trans-
portation lead time 
L/ML/MH/H 
Inventory fulfillment 
time 
1st  Marketing L/H 4th  
Raw material inven-
tory coverage 
L/ML/MH/H 
Product safety stock 
coverage 
2nd  
Raw material 
inventory cover-
age L/H 4th  Promotion depth L/ML/MH/H 
Product safety 
stock coverage 
2nd  
Raw material 
transportation 
lead time L/H 5th  
Raw material inven-
tory coverage 
L/ML/MH/H 
Inventory ful-
fillment time 
Product safety stock 
coverage 
2nd  
Promotion  
depth 
L/H 5th  
Advertising  
intensity 
L/ML/MH/H 
*L: low, ML: medium low, MH: medium high, H: high. 
5.2 Experiment Results 
In this section, we describe the experimental results and demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of the proposed GSA procedure under the hybrid simulation framework.  
For the limited space, only pure strategy equilibrium(s) are analyzed in this sec-
tion. 
 Fig. 7 Evolution of game equilibriums over GSA iterations 
Figure 7 depicts the percentage of game equilibriums computed for all 5 itera-
tions, in which the horizontal axis represents the solution percentage and the verti-
cal axis represents the payoff tolerance.  As it is a duopoly game, it is highly be-
lieved that the solution profile has the symmetric strategy for the two players (i.e. 
1 2
( ) ( )
( , )
k k
n n
S S  with 1 2n n= ).  That’s the reason why we only draw the symmetric 
strategy in Figure 7, and notify other potential solution strategies as “Others”.  In 
Figure 7, we observed that as the payoff tolerance increases within each iteration, 
the empirical game tends to involve more equilibriums than the case under zero 
tolerance.  As the tolerance value is highly related with the sample size of each 
profile, it is difficult to reduce the tolerance by sampling more data (sampling cost 
is limited).  However, the suspected solution profile with its neighborhood strate-
gies, which only involves roughly 8 to 12 data points, can be extracted out and 
sampled with more data points.  Another observation from Table 8, which con-
forms to our intuition, is when the sample size enlarges from 50 to 500, the half 
width of confidence interval for each potential solution payoff reduced.  As the it-
eration proceeds (from Iteration 1 through 5), the half width of confidence interval 
(CI) also decrease, which indicates the estimated equilibrium is closer to the true 
equilibrium.  However, under the sample size of 500, the decreasing trend of the 
CI values is not as salient as that for the case with the sample size 50 or under.  
Table 8 Comparisons of solution profiles and payoffs over GSA iterations 
Iteration ES1 ES2 
Payoff for player 1 Payoff for player 2 
Sample 
size=500 
Sample 
size=50 
Sample 
size=500 
Sample 
size=50 
Mean HW  Mean HW  Mean HW  Mean HW  
1st   8 8 23967 449 23333 1257 23922 467 23265 1184 
2nd 14 14 24438 450 23952 1129 24452 461 24401 1073 
3rd 4 4 24854 422 25829 924 24845 441 24539 822 
4th 16 16 25428 408 23778 915 25505 415 25671 841 
5th  16 16 26178 397 26964 729 26305 408 28235 866 
*ESi: Equilibrium for player i 
 
To evaluate the game equilibrium robustness (weakness vs. strictness), a group 
of 10 samples close to the estimated Nash Equilibrium (its neighborhood that have 
the similar payoff values with it) have been selected in each iteration.  Two sam-
ple t-tests (hypothesis testing 0 1 2:H  = , 1 1 2:H   ) are then performed on 
each pair of selected data samples, followed by the two-tailed P-value calculation.  
Figure 8 organizes the calculated P-values into the box-plot, in which a reduced 
trend of major portion (25%~75%) and the median of data are observed over itera-
tions for both player A (left) and B (right).  In other words, initially (Iteration 1 or 
2) the game equilibrium is not significantly different from its neighborhood val-
ues; while after several iterations, the game equilibrium is almost all significantly 
different from its neighborhood values (Iteration 5).  From the results of box-plots, 
a conclusion can be made: the game equilibrium(s) evolves from weak to strict 
during iterations of the GSA procedure. 
 Fig. 8 Box-plots for the P-values of two sample t-test on solution profile with its neighbor pro-
files over GSA iterations: player A (left); player B (right). 
Another statistical test involves the equilibrium comparisons over different it-
erations.  As there seems an increasing trend of equilibrium payoff over iterations, 
this test helps to identify how significantly different each pair of equilibrium pay-
offs is.  The one-sided hypothesis testing is constructed with 0 1 2:H  = , 
1 1 2:H   ; and the comparisons are performed between iterations.  Figure 9 
shows the comparison results in a bar chart, where the horizontal axis numbers (1 
through 7) correspond to comparison groups of (1 vs. 2), (2 vs. 3), (3 vs. 4), (4 vs. 
5), (3 vs. 5), (2 vs. 5), and (1 vs. 5), respectively.  The one-tailed P-values of all 
comparisons are listed at the bottom of Figure 9.  From the figure, it is observed 
that every iteration improves the game equilibrium payoff with different extents, 
while the equilibrium result of the last iteration (5) is significantly larger than 
those of all the previous iterations.  
 
 
Fig. 9 P-values for comparisons of solution payoffs between iterations 
Lastly, experiment results on game stability issues are provided in Table 9.  To 
ensure the steady state, each player was deciding its strategies repeatedly for an 
extremely large amount of times (e.g. 2000 times/steps in our study).  From Table 
9, a decreasing trend of instable area is observed through Iterations 1 to 5 (from 
26.17% to 14.84%).  Considering the stability set from Iterations 1 to 5, the as-
ymptotic stability area increases from 2.34% to 69.53%, and the marginal stability 
area decreases from 71.48% to 15.63% (Iteration 4 is an abnormal case and needs 
further investigation).  A larger stable area brings a greater portion of points that 
can eventually converge to the game equilibrium or its acceptable tolerance re-
gion.  So, the players or game analyst will have an increased confidence to believe 
that the calculated equilibrium could be achieved. 
Table 9 Comparisons of profile stability under tolerance 1500 =  
Iteration Ratio of AS profiles Ratio of MS profiles Ratio of instable profiles 
1st 2.34% 71.48% 26.17% 
2nd 14.84% 57.81% 27.34% 
3rd 21.09% 58.20% 20.70% 
4th 10.55% 76.56% 12.89% 
5th  69.53% 15.63% 14.84% 
*AS: Asymptotic Stable, MS: Marginal Stable 
 
In addition to the game-theoretic analysis, the proposed simulation framework 
can be used to help the company managers gain useful insights through compara-
tive analysis.  For example, Figure 10 summarizes the simulation state compari-
sons between equilibriums of Iterations 1 and 5.  Note that the horizontal axis in 
all figures is the simulation run length.  It is observed that the warm-up period 
takes roughly 40~50 days, so the simulation replication length has been set as 100 
days (horizontal axis) to reach the system steady state.  In addition, the random 
noises and disturbances are intentionally created to test how both players perform.  
As observed in Figure 10, although the averages of all the outputs are almost iden-
tical, the simulation steady state of game equilibrium in Iteration 5 (right figures in 
Figure 10) in general is more stable and involves less variations than the one in It-
eration 1 (left figures in Figure 10) given the same amount of noises and disturb-
ances.  The weak dominance in Iteration 1 is more sensitive and may change be-
tween the two players over time depending on the disturbances.  The changing 
trend tends to last long, and the changing amount tends to accumulate high before 
company takes appropriate actions to compensate.  Under the strict equilibrium, 
the dominance is shared by the two players and is not quite sensitive to the dis-
turbances.   
  
 
 
Fig. 10 Simulation steady state comparisons of game equilibrium on player A (dotted) and player 
B (straight) for different aspects between Iterations 1 (left) and 5 (right) 
5.3 Experiment Summary 
In summary, given the duopoly case study scenario discussed in Sect. 5.1, as the 
iteration proceeds in our experiments, the following experimental results have 
been found:  
1. The estimated solution payoff can reach the true solution payoff closer, which 
enhances the accuracy of equilibrium results. 
2. The game solution has moved from a weak to a strict equilibrium, which im-
proves the quality of game equilibrium. 
3. The estimated payoffs for both players increase, which provides a better win-
win situation to the game. 
4. The asymptotic and marginal stable profiles with respect to the game equilibri-
um are found to increase, which enhances the game stability. 
 
6. Conclusions and Future Directions  
In this chapter, we proposed a novel hybrid simulation model which integrates 
agent-based simulation for consumer market activities and system dynamics mod-
el for duopoly companies’ supply chain operations.  Based on the proposed model, 
we developed a novel GSA procedure, which involve various components such as 
strategy refinement, data sampling, game solving, and performance evaluation to 
resolve the simulation-based empirical game.  Then, experiments are conducted, 
where soft drink duopoly scenarios are considered involving different decision 
variables and experimental iterations.  Experiment results have successfully 
demonstrated  
• effectiveness of proposed simulation framework in terms of integrating supply 
chain operations, marketing activities, and estimating the player strategic 
movement 
• effectiveness of proposed GSA procedure in terms of achieving reduced esti-
mated errors, improvement, robustness, and stability for game equilibriums 
Future researches will focus on the following aspects.  A variety of simulation 
scenarios are in the list to further test the scalability issues of the proposed simula-
tion testbed with the GSA procedure.  A mathematical proof for the effectiveness 
and convergence of the proposed GSA procedure will enhance the practicability 
issue and help to adapt the approach depending on distinct conditions.  
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